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We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in-
complete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum
game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punish-
ment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the de-
gree of ￿rst-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment
actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these
subjects strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher ￿xed costs
of punishment lead to harsher responses. The fractions of purely self-
ish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the
variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than
predicts) parts of our ￿ndings. The treatment e￿ect is unaccounted
for. We discuss ways of incorporating our ￿ndings into the existing
models.
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11 Introduction
Despite a tradition of research on reciprocal behaviour that spans almost
three decades, the development of theories of reciprocal behaviour still is far
from complete. One indication is that there has been a proliferation of reci-
procity models (e.g., Rabin, 1993, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004, Sobel,
2005, Falk & Fischbacher, 2006, Cox et al., 2007) that all seem to ￿t speci￿c
situations better than others, and yet there is no clear indication of which
model to choose in what situation. In his 2005 review article, Sobel criticizes
the existing models of reciprocal behaviour for presenting a utility function
of others’ and own income without providing an explanation for how much
weight players are likely to put on others’ income relative to their own. More
speci￿cally, all of the models posit that the harshness of a reaction to an un-
kind action is determined by the trade-o￿ between a reduction in the other
player’s payo￿ and the costs of punishment. For costs of punishment that are
su￿ciently low, these models therefore predict the harshest-possible reaction
to even the slightest degree of unkindness. We argue ￿ and show empirically
￿ that this is wrong. However, as long as the marginal costs of punishment
are strictly positive, it is impossible to falsify the above-mentioned models
along these lines: it is always possible to adjust the reciprocation param-
eters such as to accommodate the data, given the reciprocation-parameter
distribution is left unspeci￿ed in the model expositions. This substantiates
a second criticism Sobel (2005, p. 407) expresses, namely that the ability of
intention-based models of reciprocity to account for experimental results is ￿a
tribute to their ￿exibility rather than actual support for the formulation.￿ To
corroborate the argument, we introduce the ultimatum reciprocity measure
which eliminates the marginal costs of punishment altogether. Our experi-
mental data show that a substantial proportion of the population deviates
from the models’ extreme predition in a systematic way, providing valuable
insights into how existing models need to be amended.
In a recent contribution, Cox et al. (2008) abandon the domain of explicit
functional forms and make a ￿rst step to address Sobel’s (2005) ￿rst criticism.
Our experiment suggests that their model may be an important step forward,
being able to accommodate 27-47% of our observations in addition to what
can be explained using the more traditional models. Nevertheless, the model
still is prone to Sobel’s second criticism of a lack of speci￿city: as we discuss
in section 3, the model accommodates rather than predicts our observations.
The ways in which it fails on the speci￿city domain will provide guidance
with respect to the direction in which to re￿ne the model.
Another question that has recently attracted attention in the scholarly
discussion is that of preference heterogeneity. In the context of our game,
2this particularly concerns the relative importance of intention-based recipro-
cal motives and inequity aversion (notably proposed by Bolton and Ockenfels,
2000, and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Depending on the situation, one or the
other seems to dominate. In fact, there is some indication that both play
a role: the results of the mini-ultimatum game experiments by Falk et al.
(2003) and Cox and Deck (2005) demonstrate the importance of both ap-
proaches. When the proposer has the option to o￿er an equal distribution
of earnings and an unequal one favoring herself, the responder rejects the
latter signi￿cantly more often than when the proposer has to choose between
the unequal and an even more unequal distribution of earnings (in Falk et
al., 44.4% versus 8.9%). Obviously, this result points to the importance of
reciprocity. However, when the proposer has no option but to choose the
unequal o￿er, still a substantial number of responders (18%) reject. As there
is no intention to favour herself on the part of the proposer, this observation
suggests that inequity aversion is a second empirically relevant trigger for re-
jections. Other experiments have shown similar patterns (e.g., on the convex
ultimatum game, Andreoni et al., 2003, on three-person ultimatum games,
Bereby-Meyer & Niederle, 2005, and on a three-person gift exchange game,
Th￿ni & G￿chter, 2007).
The ultimatum reciprocity measure (urm game) has the following struc-
ture: a proposer makes a proposal of how to divide an endowment E.1 The
responder can either accept or reject. In the ￿rst case, the proposal is imple-
mented, in the second, the responder obtains a ￿xed fraction  of the o￿er
x and freely chooses the proposer payo￿ from the interval [0;E   x]. The
important feature of the urm game is that (in contrast to most other games
with punishment in the literature) punishment is free of marginal-cost, only
coming at a cost that is ￿xed once the o￿er is made. 2 This ￿xed cost is
either equal to half the o￿er or to three quarters of the o￿er, depending on
the treatment. As we will show below, models of inequity-aversion and reci-
procity lead to very di￿erent predictions for behaviour in the urm game: the
￿rst class of models predicts that responders ￿if they reject an o￿er￿ leave
the proposers with a payo￿ which equals their earnings. In contrast, the
majority of reciprocity models predicts that responders leave the proposers
with zero earnings.
The results that we obtain are striking. Less than 10% of the obser-
vations can be characterized as stemming from payo￿-maximizers, models
of inequity aversion account for 16-17%, traditional models of reciprocity
1A symbols table can be found in Appendix A.
2For games that allow for a change in the other player’s payo￿ free of marginal costs,
cf., e.g., Engelmann and Strobel, 2004, or Fisman et al., 2007, who examine this question
in the dictator game.
3for 18-38%.3 At the same time, we ￿nd a substantial fraction of a fourth
type that deviates from these predictions in a systematic way, which we call
gradual reciprocators. These players are characterized by punishment pat-
terns that leave their proposers with payo￿s that are increasing in the o￿er
made but generally lead to unequal payo￿s. Moreover, the fraction of these
players is determined by the treatment parameter. In the treatment with a
high ￿xed cost of punishment, 20% of the population seem to switch from
being generalized-reciprocal to conforming to traditional reciprocity models.
These observations call for an extension of existing models of reciprocity in
the spirit of Sobel’s ￿rst criticism: a characterization of the situation that
leads to the prediction of the type distribution induced by the situation.
In section 5, we discuss a number of approaches of how to modify the
existing models in light of our observations. In particular, we characterize
the gradual-reciprocator type within the framework of Cox et al. (2008),
having dismissed the idea of matching the other’s degree of kindness due
to a lack of observations of the corresponding response-pattern predictions.
With respect to our treatment e￿ect, we reject an amendment of Cox et
al.’s (2008) de￿nition of generosity based on minimum-responder payo￿s as
being ad hoc. In contrast, we propose the situation’s coerciveness, de￿ned
in terms of the gap between the player’s highest and second-highest payo￿s,
as a promising explanation. An evaluation of the idea’s predictive power,
however, is beyond the scope of this article and is left for future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces
the urm game and presents the experimental design and procedure. Section
3 analyzes the game according to the payo￿-maximization model, inequity
aversion, and several types of reciprocity models, always focusing on respon-
der behaviour. Subsequently, we analyze the experimental data with respect
to these predictions and point to the existence of a player type that has re-
ceived little attention in the literature so far in section 4. In section 5, we
explore possible directions in which to extend existing models of reciprocal
behaviour to enable them to predict the kind of behaviour observed. Finally,
we summarize our ￿ndings and conclude in section 6.
3Note that we do not consider the proposers in our game; cf. section 3.
42 The game, experimental design, and proce-
dure
2.1 The ultimatum response measure (urm game)
Like the classic ultimatum game, the urm game has two players, a proposer
and a responder. The proposer is given an endowment of E and o￿ers x;0 
x  E, to the responder. If the responder accepts the o￿er, the proposer
keeps E   x, while the responder earns x. If the responder rejects the o￿er,
the responder earns x (the con￿ict payo￿ c
r) with a commonly known
parameter  2 [0;1), while the proposer’s con￿ict payo￿ c
p is any amount
y;y 2 [0;E   x], where y is freely chosen by the responder. Therefore, the
payo￿ functions for the proposer, p, and the responder, r, respectively, are
p =





x; in case of acceptance
x; otherwise.
Figure 1 illustrates the game tree of the urm game. Note that restricting
the response set to y  0 and setting  = 0 yields the standard two-person
ultimatum game (G￿th et al., 1982).
Due to these restrictions, the standard ultimatum game provides little
information about negative reciprocity as a driver for rejection (since it re-
duces the responder’s decision to a choice between only two alternatives).
In contrast, by imposing no marginal costs on responders to alter proposers’
payo￿s after a rejection, the ‘unrestricted’ urm game is able to provide a
very detailed picture of subjects’ motivations for rejections (as will become
clear from the discussion of theoretical predictions in the next section). In
particular, the lack of a trade-o￿ between own monetary income and proposer
payo￿ provides new insights into the nature of other-regarding preferences.
2.2 Experimental design and procedure
Each participant played one anonymous urm game either in the role of the
proposer or in the role of the responder. In the instructions, we referred
to proposers as person A and to responders as person B. The pie size was
set to E = 12 euros. O￿ers could only be made in integers. In order to
analyze individual heterogeneity of responses corresponding to di￿erent o￿ers
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Figure 1: Game tree of the ultimatum reciprocity measure.
choices (Selten, 1967).4 This means that responders had to make a decision
for each possible (integer) o￿er before they were informed about the actual
o￿er. Then, the o￿er and the corresponding responder decision determined
the payo￿s. This procedure implied that responders had to make a total of
13 acceptance/rejection decisions. Additionally, they had to determine the
payo￿ of proposers for any o￿ers rejected.
In contrast to the standard procedure of the strategy-vector method, re-
sponders were not provided with a choice menu, that is, a decision sheet that
presents all potential o￿ers in an ascending or descending order. Rather,
potential o￿ers were presented sequentially without a possibility of review-
ing earlier decisions, and the order of possible o￿ers di￿ered randomly for
all responders. We introduced this procedure for several reasons. The one-
by-one procedure was chosen to make each decision as salient as possible.
Further, eliciting decisions one by one in combination with a random order
was intended to keep any potential experimenter-demand e￿ect small by iso-
lating decisions as much as possible: to ‘smoothen’ a response-pattern over
all decisions out of a taste for consistency would in￿ict high cognitive costs
4We did not elicit hypothetical responses for accepted o￿ers as in our view, this would
have been a very counterintuitive question in the eyes of our subjects (besides the fact
that it would have been di￿cult to incentivize such an elicitation without distorting the
incentives).
6on subjects. Consequently, a smooth response-pattern should only be ob-
served if subjects exhibited underlying preferences giving rise to it. Finally,
the order was randomly determined for each subject individually, in order to
control for possible order e￿ects.
The experiment started such that copies of the instructions were handed
out to participants and read aloud. Subsequently, participants’ questions
concerning the experiments were answered privately by the instructors. Fi-
nally, all participants had to answer an electronic questionnaire testing their
understanding of the game and the payo￿ structure. 5 Before participants
answered the questionnaire, it was made clear that the only purpose of the
questionnaire was to improve the understanding of the rules of the game.
Wrong answers were privately explained and corrected before the experiment
started.
After the elicitation of acceptance and response decisions, responders were
asked to state which o￿er they considered as fair, and which o￿er they ex-
pected to receive. Subsequently, we randomly matched each responder to
a proposer and payo￿s were realized according to the decisions made. Par-
ticipants were informed about their payo￿s and asked to answer a short
socio-demographic questionnaire, before privately being paid.
In order to learn more about the nature of reciprocal preferences, we
played the game under two treatment conditions. In the high- condition,
the commonly known parameter  was set to  = 0:5, while in the low-
condition, we set  = 0:25. As we will show below, this (rather innocent)
variation has little implication for the predictions of models, while there are
important di￿erences in actual behaviour. In total, 76 pairs of proposers and
responders participated in the high- treatment, while we had 77 pairs in
the low- condition.
The laboratory experiments were conducted at the EconLab at the Uni-
versity of Bonn, Germany, in October and November 2006. 6 In total, 306
subjects participated; 50% of the subjects were female, the median age was
23 years. Participants were mostly undergraduate students from various
￿elds of studies. Approximately one third of the students were economists
or mathematicians. Further information concerning the socio-demographic
background of the participants is summarized in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
Average payment was 5.15 Euros (no show-up fee), corresponding to an av-
erage length of the experiment of 30 minutes, including the instruction time
and the time for paying subjects.
5Translations of the German instructions and the questionnaire are provided in Ap-
pendix B.
6Experiments were computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). For the recruitment
of subjects, we used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
73 Theoretical predictions
Our central research interest lies in the empirical analysis of reciprocal be-
haviour. For this reason, we will focus on the behaviour of responders
throughout the paper. Proposer behaviour is unsuitable for our purposes:
proposals re￿ect both proposers’ other-regarding preferences as well as pro-
posers’ strategic considerations concerning the other-regarding preferences of
responders.
We will analyze responders’ best-response functions according to all ma-
jor models that are potential candidates for the explanation of reciprocal
behaviour. For brevity and ease of exposition, we refrain from presenting the
complete sets of equilibria as they do not shed further light on our research
question. In the following, we discuss three (groups of) models, the ‘standard’
game-theoretic prediction, models of inequity-aversion, and intention-based
models of reciprocal behaviour. Before we do so, let us clarify some notation.
If a model predicts rejection of an o￿er, it will have to specify a value for
the response y. This may be the case for all, some, or none of the o￿ers,
and consequently, the response y is contingent on the o￿er. To re￿ect this,
we will write y = y(x) to denote the (o￿er) response function. Yet, there is
a second way to think about responses, which will prove useful particularly
in the context of treatment comparisons. For this purpose, we introduce
the con￿ict-payo￿ response function (de￿ning the response y in terms of the
con￿ict payo￿ c
r = x), which we will denote by y = (c
r).
3.1 Pure payo￿-maximizing preferences.
The best reply of a responder exclusively driven by material self-interest is
obvious: given 0 <  < 1, we have x > x for any x > 0, and x = x
for x = 0. Consequently, payo￿-maximizing responders’ best reply is to
always accept any positive o￿er x, and arbitrarily accept or reject a proposal
of x = 0. Given this feature, we will not observe values of y for these
players. If at all, we observe a value for y in response to x = 0; however,
the theory does not give any prediction for this value. Therefore, payo￿-
maximizing responders’ best-response function is given by brpm : x ! (;y),
where  2 f0;1g represents rejection,  = 0, or acceptance,  = 1:
brpm(x) =
(
(1;:) if x > 0;
(0;y0) if x = 0;
(1)
where (0;y0) 2 f(;y)j 2 f0;1g;y 2 [0;E]g. Of course, no treatment di￿er-
ences are expected.
83.2 Inequity-averse preferences.
In a ￿rst step, note that inequity-averse responders will always choose to
equalize payo￿s after a rejection, since it is costless to alter the proposer’s
payo￿ once the costs of rejecting are sunk. In other words, their response
y will be y(x) = x for all rejected o￿ers x. Which o￿ers will be rejected?
Both the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and by Bolton and Ockenfels
(2000) predict accepted o￿ers x to come from a convex set [x;x], where
0  x < E=2 < x  E. The speci￿c values of x and x depend on the
parameters of the model, notably on  (since it determines the monetary
earnings in case of a con￿ict) and the importance the individual responder
places on equity concerns. To indicate the dependence between x and , and
x and , we will write x and x. Both models would suggest there to be
heterogeneity in the cut-o￿ values for rejections, while the above speci￿cation
of y(x) = x is unique in all models of inequity aversion. In summary, we
obtain the following best-reply function bria : x ! (;y):
bria(x) =
(
(0;x) if x > x or x < x;
(1;:) if x  x  x:
(2)
The predicted treatment e￿ects are evident: an increase in  shifts both
acceptance thresholds ‘inwards’ towards the egalitarian payo￿ distribution
(E=2;E=2). With respect to responses as a function (c
r) of con￿ict payo￿s,
no treatment di￿erences are expected.
3.3 Intention-based preferences.
For our discussion of these models, we sub-divide this class into four sub-
classes: (i) one in which utility functions consist of a linear combination of
own income and a reciprocity term (which itself is a product of several terms
as described below, cf. Rabin, 1993, Levine, 1998, 7 Dufwenberg & Kirch-
steiger, 2004, Falk & Fischbacher, 2006), (ii) the non-linear model of Cox,
Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007), (iii) models mixing reciprocity concerns and
inequality aversion, and ￿nally, (iv) the model presented by Cox, Friedman,
and Sadiraj (2008).
‘Linear’ reciprocity models. In the models subsumed under this class,
utility is a linear combination of own income and reciprocity. Here, reci-
7Strictly speaking, the model of Levine (1998) is di￿erent from the other models listed
in a number of important aspects. However, the best replies are very similar, given in
Levine (1998) a player’s utility function is given by a linear combination of all players’
monetary payo￿s.
9procity is a product of three terms. The ￿rst weights the importance of
reciprocal behaviour to the person. The second term captures the kindness
of the other player’s past behaviour. O￿ers are ranked from unkind (i.e.,
small) to kind (i.e, large) ones, such that the term for an o￿er which is nei-
ther kind nor unkind is zero and increases (decreases) monotonically with
each rank above (below) that o￿er. Consequently, unkind o￿ers have neg-
ative values and kind o￿ers have positive values. The third term measures
the degree of kindness in the person’s reaction. Again, responses are ranked
such that a response that is neither kind nor unkind corresponds to a value of
zero, and responses above (below) that lead to values increasing (decreasing)
monotonically with each rank. At the time of the responder’s decision in the
ultimatum reciprocity measure, the ￿rst two terms are ￿xed. Consequently,
maximization of utility in combination with the possibility of choosing the
proposer’s payo￿ free of marginal cost implies the following for rejected of-
fers: the best reply to any unkind o￿er x must be the most unkind response
possible, that is, y(x) = 0; 8x < x. Conversely, any rejected kind o￿er must
be answered with y(x) = E  x; 8x > x, the kindest response possible. In
other words, there cannot be a rejection followed by a response y0(xr), so that
0 < y0(xr) < E xr. As for the inequity-aversion models above, the switch-
ing point between acceptance and rejection is player-speci￿c and generally






(0;E   x) if x > x;
(1;:) if x  x  x
(0;0) if x < x:
(3)
Obviously, no treatment variations are predicted with respect to y(x) or
(c
r). The lower acceptance threshold x rises with , as a higher  makes
rejection less costly. At the same time, there is no clear prediction with
respect to x: while a higher  implies a higher ‘con￿ict’ payo￿ x, it also
leads to a lower potential for rewarding actions: E   0x < E   00x for
0 > 00. Therefore, the sign of the change in the upper acceptance threshold
depends on the weight the responder places on reciprocity.
Non-linear models of reciprocity. Even though Cox et al. (2007) pro-
pose a remarkable model that generalizes the above reciprocity-models in an
important way, it yields the same predictions for responder behaviour in the
ultimatum reciprocity measure as the ‘linear’ reciprocity models. In fact, util-
ity is again a linear combination of own income and a reciprocity term, where
the latter multiplies the proposer-payo￿ with an ￿emotional-state￿ function
10.  is a function of the proposer’s previous behaviour, and therefore, a ￿xed
factor at the time of the responder’s decision. Consequently, the arguments
from our discussion of the ‘linear’ models carry over and hence, the predicted
best-reply function has the same form as equation (3) above.
Mixed approach A special variation of reciprocity models is the approach
by Charness and Rabin (2002) which mixes reciprocity concerns and inequal-
ity aversion.8 In this model, a responder’s utility function adds own payo￿
and the proposer’s payo￿, weighted by a term that integrates inequality as
well as reciprocity concerns. In particular, this weight is lowered if the pro-
poser receives more money than the responder and if the proposer misbe-
haves. However, even if the weight for reciprocity depends on the degree of
misbehaviour (as in the extended model in the appendix of Charness and
Rabin, 2002), the sum of weights is either positive or negative. Once again,
the same arguments as for the ‘linear’ reciprocity models apply, leading to
the same predictions.
General approach to reciprocity. Cox et al. (2008) present their novel
approach to reciprocal behaviour within the framework of the proposer-
payo￿￿responder-payo￿ space. In this space, the choice set S of the responder
consists of one point and a ray parallel to the proposer-payo￿ axis. The point
describes the o￿er, while the ray characterizes possible payo￿ combinations
in case of a rejection, as depicted in Figure 2. Notice that our treatment vari-
ation does not change the location of the point, but shifts the ray in low-
closer to the proposer-payo￿ axis compared to the situation in high-.
Responder preferences are represented by indi￿erence curves  2 , where
 is a player’s indi￿erence-curve set for a given situation. To illustrate, indif-
ference curves of payo￿-maximizing players are lines parallel to the proposer-
payo￿ axis, those of inequity-averse players are either convex (Bolton & Ock-
enfels, 2000) or piece-wise linear with a kink at the 45-degree line (Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999), indi￿erence curves in the ‘linear’ reciprocity models (as well
as in the ‘mixed’ model by Charness & Rabin, 2002) are straight lines that
are either upward-sloping (negative reciprocity) or downward-sloping (posi-
tive reciprocity), while the model of Cox et al. (2007) generalizes the ‘linear’
reciprocity models by allowing the indi￿erence curves to be non-linear; how-
ever, their slope cannot change signs. Irrespective of their shape, indi￿erence
curves always can be ranked such that 0 is said to be ‘higher’ than 00 if points
8In fact, the approach by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) also represents a mixture of
reciprocity and inequality considerations, as reciprocation by the responder is triggered
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Figure 2: Payo￿ space for responders
associated with 0 are preferred to points associated with 00. Finally, when-
ever we talk about the -de￿ned point in S, we mean the point associated
with the highest indi￿erence curve in  which still is in the choice set S.9
At the center of the approach by Cox et al. (2008) are two basic de￿ni-
tions, one concerns perceived kindness and the other kindness in (re-)actions.
First, let us de￿ne perceived kindness, or ￿generosity￿. In this model, the
notion of generosity is attached to responders’ opportunity sets, or, more
precisely, to opportunity sets after they have been altered by the action of
the proposer.10 Particularly, consider the set Sx of possible payo￿ combi-
nations (p;r) which proposer and responder can gain after the proposer
has chosen x. Let us de￿ne ^ i(x) = supi Sx for i = p;r. A set Sx0 is
called ￿more generous than￿ a set Sx00 if (i) ^ r(x0)   ^ r(x00)  0 and (ii)
^ r(x0)   ^ r(x00)  ^ p(x0)   ^ p(x00). In other words, the proposer is more gen-
erous by choosing x0 than by choosing x00 if (i) the proposer’s choice of x0
over x00 does not lead to a decrease in the maximum payo￿ the responder
can earn, and (ii) the increase of responder’s payo￿ as a result of decision x0
compared to x00 is not less than the corresponding increase in the proposer’s
9We do not refer to this point as the tangential point, as in case of acceptance as well
as for some of the models, it would be inadequate to speak of tangents: there cannot be
a tangent to a point, and in some cases, the (highest) indi￿erence curve will have a kink
at the -de￿ned point.
10Strictly speaking, the notion of an opportunity set as used by Cox et al. (2008) would
rule out application of their model to our game, as they require opportunity sets to be
convex. However, we do not see why non-convexity of opportunity sets would lead to
problems in the analysis. Hence, we drop the convexity assumption, as we are convinced
that their model is an important tool to understand behaviour in our game.
12payo￿. According to this de￿nition, an o￿er x0 in the urm game is more
generous than x00 if and only if x0  x00.
Second, let us de￿ne kindness in action, which is termed ￿altruism￿.
Altruism is attached to the responder’s utility function ur(r;p) and the
corresponding curvature of responder’s convex indi￿erence curves  in the
payo￿-space f(p;r)g. For convenience, it is de￿ned in terms of a player i’s
willingness-to-pay for a marginal increase in the payo￿ of player j, WTPi =
[@ui(i;j)=@j]=[@ui(i;j)=@i], rather than i’s marginal rate of substitu-
tion MRSi = 1=WTPi. The responder’s utility function u0
r(r;p) is said
to be ￿more altruistic than￿ u00
r(r;p) if WTP 0
r  WTP 00
r ;8(r;p). Equiva-
lently, the utility function associated with indi￿erence curves 0 is more al-
truistic than the function associated with 00 if, compared to 00, the curves
in 0 are rotated counter-clockwise (compare Figure 3). As a consequence,
the proposer payo￿ 0
p in the 0-de￿ned point in Sx must not be smaller than
00













































Figure 3: Indi￿erence curves (a) 0 and (b) 00 (0 being more altruistic than
00)
Within this framework, reciprocity is de￿ned as follows: a proposer’s
decision leading to Sx0 rather than Sx00 (Sx0 being more generous than Sx00)
induces indi￿erence curves 0 rather than 00 on the part of the responder
(with u0
r(r;p) more altruistic than u00
r(r;p)). Loosely speaking, more
generous o￿ers lead to more altruistic preferences.
Having outlined the model, we now apply it to the urm game. Recall that
the convex indi￿erence curves are rotated clockwise for less generous o￿ers.
That is, the smaller the o￿er, the steeper ￿ or ￿atter, in case of upward-
sloping curves ￿ the indi￿erence curves. As a consequence, the intersection
13between the highest indi￿erence curve and the choice set decreases or remains
constant, but never increases in the proposer-payo￿ dimension for o￿ers of
decreasing generosity.11 Since altering the proposer’s payo￿ is costless and
infp Sx = 0;8x (i.e., the lower bound of the choice set does not change for
di￿erent o￿ers) we can conclude that for two rejected o￿ers x0 and x00 such
that x0 > x00, y(x0)  y(x00) must hold.
Which o￿ers will be rejected? Like in any of the models presented, the
model proposed by Cox et al. (2008) assumes that utility from own income
is traded o￿ against a second utility component that is in￿uenced by others’
income. If the responder rejects an o￿er, the utility gains from this second
component must outweigh the decrease in one’s own income. Hence, the
responder must have a positive WTP in response to very generous o￿ers
(e.g., rejecting x  x and responding by y > E  x) ￿ although this scenario
appears hardly intuitive at the ￿rst glance ￿ or have a negative WTP for p
in response to very ungenerous o￿ers (e.g., rejecting x  x and responding
by y < E   x), so that accepted o￿ers come from a convex set [x;x]. The
speci￿c values of x and x again depend on the importance the individual
responder places on reciprocity. Thus, we obtain the following best-reply
function brre : x ! (;y):
brre(x) =
(
(0;y0(x)) if x > x or x < x;
(1;:) if x  x  x:
(4)
where y0(x) must satisfy @y0=@x  0.
With respect to treatment e￿ects, we ￿rst turn to changes in the o￿er-
response function y(x). In response to an increase in , the model allows for
both monotonic increases and invariance at any given level, merely ruling out
reductions in the response.12 Turning to treatment e￿ects on the con￿ict-
payo￿ response function, recall that our treatment variation does not alter the
supremum of r in the set Sx for a given o￿er x, since the value of  changes
the ray, but not the point (i.e., the o￿er, which de￿nes the supremum).
Hence, the treatment variation does not change the generosity of o￿ers. 13
On the other hand, the same con￿ict payo￿ c
r is associated with di￿erent
o￿ers in the di￿erent treatments: under a low , a higher o￿er is associated
with the same con￿ict payo￿ than under a high . At the same time, higher
11Strictly speaking, this argument requires preferences to have the increasing benevo-
lence property, which Cox et al. (2008) de￿ne as a willingness to pay for the other player’s
income that does not decrease in own income.
12Once again, this requires invoking the increasing benevolence property, cf. ftn. 11.
13Strictly speaking, this statement is not correct. Please, refer to the discussion in
section 5 for why we hold the above assertion to be in the spirit of the model.
14o￿ers are attached to higher levels of generosity and therefore, met with
higher degrees of altruism. As a consequence, the con￿ict-payo￿ response
function (c
r) may di￿er between the treatments: for 0 < 00, the same
con￿ict payo￿ c
r = 0x0 = 00x00 implies (0x0)  (0x00).
With respect to acceptance thresholds, the model predicts a decrease of
the acceptance threshold x for decreasing . To see this, take the o￿er x0 that
makes the responder indi￿erent between accepting and rejecting under 0.
Let us now decrease . Recall that a change in  leaves the responder-payo￿
supremum una￿ected and hence, indi￿erence curves do not change as the
responder’s degree of altruism remains the same. But with the indi￿erence
curves remaining the same and the ray of S0
x shifting left, the responder must
now prefer to accept the o￿er. By the same token, changing  may change
the upper threshold x. By the convexity of preferences and the linearity
with respect to variations of  of the maximum-possible reward (E  x), it
is immediately obvious that an increase in  cannot be associated with an
increase in the upper acceptance threshold (and more often than not, it will
lead to a decrease in x). Figure 4 visualizes the e￿ect of varying  for the
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Figure 4: Example for the in￿uence of a  variation on o￿er acceptance
In the preceding paragraphs, we have presented qualitative predictions
that can be derived from the general model by Cox et al. (2008). Virtu-
ally all of these predictions have been weak, in the sense exempli￿ed by the
statement that ￿for o￿ers of decreasing generosity, the response cannot in-
crease.￿ By employing weak inequalities in all of their de￿nitions, Cox et
al. (2008) encompass all of the existing model predictions in one framework.
The model would be able to account even for o￿er-response functions equal
15to a strictly positive constant, in contrast to any of the other models. It
does place a number of restrictions on behaviour that can be expected, most
notably perhaps the requirement of a certain degree of consistency. However,
it does not make clear predictions like the remaining models presented. In
other words, what the model gains in generality, it looses in terms of speci-
￿ty. We consider this an important shortcoming and brie￿y review potential
directions of model re￿nement to eschew this problem in section 5 of this
article. To prepare the ￿oor for the results, we summarize the predictions
from the di￿erent models in Table 1.
Table 1: Predictions of the models discussed
Response y(x) to o￿ers 0 < x < x x > x
Payo￿-maximization Not applicable: all o￿ers are accepted
Inequity aversion x minfx;E   xg
Reciprocity (linear/non-linear/mixed) 0 E   x
Cox et al. (2008) @y=@x  0 y > E   x;@y=@x  0
4 Results
We structure the presentation of our results as follows: ￿rst, we character-
ize rejection behaviour of responders. Second,we analyze response patterns.
Third, we systematically relate response patterns to rejection behaviour. We
relegate presentation of data on o￿ers, expected o￿ers, as well of as role-
contingent average payo￿s to appendix Appendix C, as these are not in the
focus of this study.
4.1 Rejections
84% of actual o￿ers in the high- condition (81% in the low- condition)
were accepted. Following our theoretical discussion from the previous section,
we de￿ne an upper and a lower acceptance threshold for each responder i, xi
and xi, as follows:
xi = maxfxji(x) = 1g and
xi = maxfxjx  6;i(x) = 0g; (5)
where i(x) denotes the acceptance decision of responder i for a certain o￿er
x. Note that inequity aversion and reciprocity predict regularity with respect
16Table 2: Numbers of responders according to acceptance thresholds
xi xi
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 10 11 12
high- 3 5 5 9 42 11 1 1 1 10 64
low- 8 6 9 19 27 6 1 0 1 5 71
to rejections, that is, i(x) = 1;8x 2 [xi;xi], and i(x) = 0, otherwise.
In total, 32 out of 153 responders exhibit rejection decisions that violate
regularity. While this is more than typically observed (see Camerer, 2003),
only 9 of them (6% of all responders) make more than one decision that
would contradict regularity. We attribute the remaining 23 violations to the
di￿culty arising from the random-order one-by-one presentation of possible
o￿ers. To account for this fact and use as much information as possible, we
chose the above de￿nition of xi.14 The further analysis includes the data
of all responders. Responders are classi￿ed according to their acceptance
thresholds; Table 2 reports the number of responders in each lower and upper
acceptance class, jjxijj and jjxijj, respectively.
The average xi is signi￿cantly higher in high- (3:57 vs. 2:97 in low-,
p = 0:003; also, as can be easily seen from Table 2, xi from the high- treat-
ment ￿rst-order statistically dominates xi from the low- condition).15 At
the same time, the treatment di￿erence between upper acceptance thresholds
xi fails to reach signi￿cance (11:80 vs. 11:91, p = 0:114). However, this is
not a strong indication that there is no e￿ect: while most responders never
reject an o￿er above the equal split, the number of those who do in high-
(12 out of 76) is double the corresponding number from the low- treatment
(6 out of 77; again, statistical dominance holds).
4.2 Responses
Given our main research interest lies in the study of reciprocal behaviour,
responses to rejected o￿ers are the central element in our analysis. In the
following, we will identify rejected o￿ers as xr, so that the response to a
14Our qualitative results and statistical inferences do not change if we de￿ne xi using
the more straightforward de￿nition xi = minfxji(x) = 1g, indicating the robustness of
our ￿ndings.
15Unless otherwise indicated, all comparisons are based on two-sided Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests. Behaviour of economists/mathematicians and other participants does not di￿er
signi￿cantly with respect to any variable measured.
17rejected o￿er is y(xr). In light of the exploratory nature of our study, we
want to get as close as possible to the raw data. Therefore, we classify
the response functions according to mutually exclusive type categories. We
de￿ne the types based on the theoretical predictions summarized in table 1.
Participants whose responses could not be ￿tted into the categories de￿ned
by the presented models were grouped according to the broad characteristics
of their responses.
Null. Subjects falling into this category accept all o￿ers except for o￿ers
x = 0, in which case they respond by y(0) = 0. This behaviour can be
classi￿ed as either sel￿sh, inequity-averse or reciprocal, and therefore does
not provide much information about the nulls’ motivations.
Accepters. Subjects falling into this category accept all o￿ers.
Symbolic. Subjects falling into this category accept most o￿ers but reject at
least one. However, their rejection is only symbolic ￿ they administer the
proposer the amount the latter asked for: y(xr) = E   xr.
Gentle punishers. Subjects falling into this category reject some o￿ers but
leave the proposer better o￿ than themselves for xr < 6, i.e., y(xr) > xr.
Inequity-averse. Inequity-averse players conform to the predictions of the
corresponding models: whenever they reject an o￿er xr which they do for at
least two o￿ers x, they respond by choosing y(xr) = xr.
Reciprocal: linear. Subjects falling into this category conform to the predic-
tions of all major reciprocity models: whenever they reject an o￿er xr which
they do for at least two o￿ers x, they respond by punishing the other player
as harshly as possible, y(xr) = 0.
Reciprocal: generalized. Subjects falling into this category leave proposers
worse o￿ than themselves whenever they reject an o￿er xr > 0. However, at
least for some xr < x, they return more than 0, i.e., 0  y(xr)  xr, where
each inequality is strong for at least one rejected o￿er xr.
Between. Subjects are categorized to fall in between the other categories if
they reject various o￿ers and choose y(xr) such that they would belong to
di￿erent categories for di￿erent xr.
Table 3 summarizes the results of our classi￿cation analysis. Additionally
to the categories detailed above, we subdivided the category reciprocal: gen-
eralized into two sub-categories. This was done in order to obtain a better
picture of those response patterns which have not been described in the liter-
ature up to now. The response patterns are categorized by taking the slope
of a linear regression of responses y(xr) on rejected o￿ers xr;xr  6. Pat-
terns exhibiting a slope of less than 0.2 are categorized as static and slopes
of at least 0.2 lead to a categorization as gradual reciprocators . We make the
following observations:
First, taking into account all response patterns that could potentially
18Table 3: Frequency of responder types
high- (in %) low- (in %)
Null 3 3.9 6 7.8
Accepters 1 1.3 1 1.3
Symbolic 1 1.3 1 1.3
Gentle rejecters 3 3.9 4 5.2
Inequity-averse 13 17.1 12 15.6
Reciprocal: linear 14 18.4 29 37.7
Reciprocal: generalized 36 47.4 21 27.3
static 5 6.6 5 6.5
gradual 31 40.8 16 20.8
Between 5 6.6 3 3.9
Total 76 77
result from preferences of a payo￿-maximizing player ￿ null, accepters, and
one of the symbolic observations ￿ we count only 12 subjects (4 in high-,
8 in low-) out of 153 (8%). Hence, compared to typical results from other
variations of the ultimatum game (e.g., see Andreoni et al., 2003), the urm
game yields much less ‘sel￿sh’ behaviour by responders.
Second, the sum of all players whose behaviour can be described by one
of the theoretic models outlined in section 3 excluding the model by Cox
et al. (2008) makes up for only 31 out of 76 in high- and 49 out of 77 in
low-. In other words, traditional models account for only about 40% (60%)
of the observed response patterns in high- (low-). More speci￿cally, we
observe a stable 16-17% inequity-averse players, while the number belonging
to di￿erent subclasses of reciprocity di￿ers substantially across treatment
conditions. Most subjects not exhibiting behaviour as predicted by the above
models can be categorized as generalized-reciprocal. The model of Cox et
al. (2008) can account for these observations. However, it accommodates
rather than predicts them. Below, we explore a number of ways in which our
understanding of generalized-reciprocal behaviour may be characterized on
the basis of their model.
Third, in high-, the fraction of players falling into the category of grad-
ual reciprocators is higher than in low- by 20%. At the same time, the
high- fraction of linear-reciprocal players is lower by almost the same 20%.
In other words, the data look as if a change in  from 0.5 to 0.25 changed the
response function of about 20% of the population such that they no longer
di￿erentiate the severity of punishment with respect to an o￿er’s unkindness.
19Table 4: Mean lower acceptance thresholds by treatment and type
Responder type high low
Inequity-averse 4.08 3.50
Reciprocal: linear 3.71 3.31
Reciprocal: generalised
- static 3.80 3.40
- gradual 3.97 3.00
In our view, these observations are critical: further development of any
reciprocity model should account for both generalized-reciprocal behaviour
and the parameter-induced shift in the type distribution, if it is to be seen as
a step forward in our understanding of reciprocal behaviour. For this reason,
we devote section 5 to some ideas on possible directions in which to extend
existing models of reciprocity, discussing them in light of our observations.
Before we do so, we shed some light on the interaction between response
patterns and rejections in the following part.
4.3 The interaction between response patterns and re-
jections
In the following paragraph, we brie￿y report the results of a comparison
of lower acceptance thresholds between the three main types, reported in
Table 4. While we do not ￿nd any signi￿cant di￿erences of lower accep-
tance thresholds between inequity-averse, linear-reciprocal, and generalised-
reciprocal players within each treatment (all pair-wise comparisons yield
p > 0:15), we observe a very di￿erentiated picture across treatments. Both
for inequity-averse and linear-reciprocal players, the treatment di￿erence in
lower acceptance thresholds is in the predicted direction but clearly fails to be
signi￿cant (p = 0:249 and p = 0:308, respectively). The same holds for static
generalised-reciprocal players (p = 0:762). However, for subjects classi￿ed
as gradual reciprocators, there is a treatment e￿ect: in low-, they accept
signi￿cantly lower o￿ers than in high- suggesting that for this sub-class of
players, fairness considerations are substantially in￿uenced by a situational
variation.
205 Generalized-reciprocal behaviour
In this section, we set out to explore possible directions in which existing
models may be changed to account for our ￿ndings. Our data call for two
things. The presence of a substantial fraction of subjects who can be cate-
gorized as gradual reciprocators calls for a theoretic characterization of such
players. And the shift in the type distribution in response to our treatment
variation calls for a theory that is able to predict that shift. Our discussion
of ways to meet these challenges will be divided into two parts. First, we
review and discard a simple extension of linear models of reciprocity. Sub-
sequently, we provide a more detailed discussion within the model of Cox et
al. (2008), paying tribute to the fact that it is the only available model able
to accommodate our ￿ndings.
5.1 Linear reciprocity models
In the reciprocity models reviewed in this paper, there are two components
of reciprocal behaviour: an assessment of the other player’s kindness, or gen-
erosity, and the degree of reciprocation, or altruism in a player’s response.
Linear models like Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004), or Falk and Fischbacher (2006) aggregate an action’s degree of gen-
erosity into a (relative) weight that is put on the other player’s payo￿; the
degree of kindness of ￿ or altruism in ￿ a response then follows from the
maximization of the weighted payo￿ sum. A very simple idea that would
be able to meet both challenges posed by our data is to modify the models
by specifying players’ utility function such that it is maximized if the degree
of altruism meets a certain target, namely the degree of generosity of the
other player’s action. This is akin to what most legal systems do: matching
punishment to the severity of an o￿ence, rather than assigning the maximum
penalty to all infringements alike.
In principle, there are three ways to apply this idea to our game; however,
only one of them can address both challenges posed by our data. As in the
earlier reciprocity models, a responder would evaluate kindness against the
‘fairness’ or neutrality benchmark (in our game, presumably corresponding
to the equal split) and, after a rejection, assign the proposer a fraction (i) of
the o￿er, so that y(x) = x=6, (ii) of the responder’s con￿ict payo￿, yielding
y(x) = x=6, or (iii) of the amount requested by the proposer, translating
into y(x) = (12   x)=6.16 The second possibility would predict a treatment
16Another option would be to evaluate the kindness of the o￿er after rejection, that is,
of the con￿ict payo￿ against the equal split; however, this would mean that even the equal
split itself would be unkind, which is counterintuitive.
21di￿erence in the o￿er response function y(x) as we see in our data. However,
we do not want to propagate this possibility due to our empirical ￿ndings:
the above conjecture (ii) makes precise point-predictions for the values of the
response y that does not conform with the results for the vast majority of
players categorized as gradual reciprocators even if we allow for rounding.
More speci￿cally, no point-prediction would be adequate, as the response-
function variance within this group is rather large. 17 In light of this fact, it
seems unsatisfactory to choose conjecture (ii) as a suitable step forward in
modeling reciprocal behaviour.
5.2 Gradual reciprocity in the model of Cox et al. (2008)
Before we dwell on potential ways to account for our ￿ndings, we need to
discuss an earlier imprecision in our exposition related to the reciprocity
model by Cox et al. (2008).18 We claimed that the model does not dis-
cern in terms of generosity between the same o￿er made in both treatments.
However, blindly applying the de￿nition of generosity, we would conclude
that a given o￿er x is more generous when made in high- than when
made in low-. To see this, note that the ￿rst part of the de￿nition,
^ high
r (x)   ^ low
r (x)  0, trivially holds ￿ the maximum the responder can
obtain under o￿er x is identical in both treatments (namely, the o￿er itself),
and thus, ^ high
r (x)   ^ low
r (x) = 0. At the same time, the second part also
holds, as ^ high
r (x) ^ low
r (x) > ^ high
p (x) ^ low
p (x), since for the right hand side
of this equation it follows (12   x
2)   (12   x
4) =  x
4. In other words, the
opportunity set de￿ned by an o￿er x in high- is more generous than the
same o￿er in low- because it leads to the same payo￿ maximum for the
responder but the proposer could be rewarded more in low-. This state-
ment may be plausible when we think about very generous o￿ers, and thus,
the domain of positively reciprocal behaviour. However, for low o￿ers x, it
does not make sense conceptually: to see this, let us take the counterfactual
perspective that the o￿er x is ￿xed but the proposer may choose the value
of , and therefore, the responder’s con￿ict payo￿ c
r. Then, application of
the model de￿nition of generosity would mean that a proposer would choose
17In contrast, players categorized as conforming to either inequity-aversion or reci-
procity models exactly conform to the corresponding point-prediction (abstracting from
rare acceptance-decision errors).
18A second imprecision is that the model is not applicable to our game if we stick to Cox
et al.’s exposition, given the opportunity sets in our game are not convex, and therefore,
not opportunity sets in the sense of their de￿nition. However, we think it would not be
conducive not to consider the model on these grounds, as it is a powerful tool to think
about reciprocal behaviour, and one that deserves further development.
22smaller con￿ict payo￿s (i.e., smaller ) because he might be rewarded for it
￿ which contradicts any common notion of the concept of reciprocity. There-
fore, we argue that basing the assertion that the opportunity set in high-
is more generous than its corresponding set in low- on the model under
discussion is against its very spirit, and therefore, we contend that the model
does not provide su￿cient reason to predict the shift in response harshness
we observe in the experiment.19
Having discussed Cox et al.’s de￿nition of generosity at length, we are
ready to review possible modi￿cations. First of all, we suggest characterizing
our gradual reciprocators by requiring the monotonicity of responses to op-
portunity sets ￿ as ordered corresponding to their generosity ￿ to be strict.
In terms of the model, these players are characterized as follows: if Sx0 is
strictly more generous than Sx00 (in the sense that the ￿rst inequality in the
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subjects di￿erentiates their altruism according to the severity of an o￿ence.
On the other hand, participants with ￿at response patterns, most notably,
linear-reciprocal subjects, no longer fall into the category.
5.3 The treatment e￿ect on the type distribution
Our discussion from the preceding paragraphs may suggest that the critical
aspect of the model on which re￿nement may be necessary is its de￿nition
of generosity. We argue that this may not be a useful approach and suggest
an alternative below. Focusing on a re￿nement of generosity, a possible way
capable of solving the problem in the speci￿c context of our game would be
to add a third part to the de￿nition, comparing minimum responder payo￿s
in the respective opportunity sets. Then, a given o￿er x would lead to a
higher minimum responder payo￿ in high- than it would in low-, and
therefore, the o￿er x would be seen as nicer in high- than in low-. On
the other hand, adding part after part to the de￿nition does not seem like a
sensible approach: this would extend the set of situations further in which
the theory is unable to make any prediction at all.
What this discussion may suggest more broadly is that there may not
be a one-size-￿ts-all description of generosity. Possibly, generosity has to
be de￿ned by situational classes, in conjunction with a theory that catego-
rizes situations into these classes. Furthermore, there may be heterogeneity
in people’s assessment of other people’s generosity. More radically still, it
would even be conceivable that subjects di￿er more in their perception of
generosity than in their reaction function. Put di￿erently, an interesting re-
19As stressed above, this does not mean the model cannot accommodate the observations.
23search question for future work is how much of the observed heterogeneity in
behaviour is actually due to heterogeneity in perception.
How can we account for the observed type shift between treatments? We
propose that the coerciveness of an o￿er may provide the explanation. To
show this, let us suggest the following argument: a responder’s position in
low- seems much less comfortable than in high-, given ￿ holding the
o￿er the same ￿ the responder in low- has to renounce a larger amount
of money than the responder in high-. So, we may expect the responder
in low- to be more reluctant to reject a given o￿er than the responder
in high-, and therefore, that the proposer’s position is more powerful in
low- as compared to high-. In other words, the situation in low- can
be interpreted as being more coercive; if the coerciveness of the situation
determines the intensity of responders’ reaction to a given o￿er, then we
should observe the type shift we observe. 20 A possible mechanism that may
give rise to the postulated e￿ect would be that responders display an aversion
to proposers abusing their power.
Is there a way in which to characterize the coerciveness of an o￿er? An in-
tuitive way would be to compare the highest and the second-highest possible
responder payo￿s, potentially normalized using the highest-possible respon-
der payo￿. In the games examined by Cox et al. (2008), coerciveness would
always be zero as they require opportunity sets to be convex; however, when
applying the model to discrete opportunity sets as in our game, the hypothe-
sis can, indeed, distinguish between di￿erent situations. To develop this idea
fully and incorporate it into a modi￿ed version of the model goes beyond the
scope of this article.
6 Summary and discussion
In this article, we present the ultimatum reciprocity measure ( urm game) as
an analytical tool for the inquiry into the nature of reciprocal behaviour. In
contrast to many other games (e.g., the ultimatum game or the trust game),
it gives rise to very clear and distinct predictions of models of inequity aver-
sion on the one hand, and ‘traditional’ models of reciprocity, on the other.
The model of Cox et al. (2008) accommodates both predictions as well as
20One may argue that proposers who make the same o￿er to the responder in low-
than in high- do so despite their more powerful position. Therefore, if proposer do not
exploit their powerful position, one could conjecture that this non-exploitation is a kind
act that should be rewarded under a reciprocity hypothesis. However, this is not consistent
with our data: the same o￿er is punished as harshly as possible by a larger fraction of
subjects in low-, rather than the other way around.
24data that fall in between the two extremes. An important empirical aspect
of our study is to provide data on the relative frequency of these types (and
possibly others, if they were to be observed). Using second-movers’ response
patterns, we classify our subjects. Our ￿ndings are remarkable. Less than
10% of the responders in our study exhibit behaviour that can be explained
by payo￿-maximization; 16-17% can be classi￿ed as inequity-averse; ‘tradi-
tional’ models of reciprocity account for another 18-38%, depending on the
treatment. This means that the main models discussed in the literature ac-
count for only 45-64% of the observations. Adding the model of Cox et al.
(2008), this number increases to over 90%. We count this as evidence that
the latter model is an important step forward in the quest for understanding
reciprocal behaviour.
At the same time, we observe a systematic shift of behaviour between
treatments that is unaccounted for by any of the models discussed in the
literature. Decreasing the responder’s con￿ict payo￿ by one half leads to a
strong decrease in the frequency of players characterized as gradual recipro-
cators; at the same time, the frequency of linear-reciprocity types increases
by the same amount. It seems as if the parameter di￿erence induces one ￿fth
of the population to respond in a qualitatively di￿erent way. In section 5,
we discuss a number of possible ways to account for this shift. The expla-
nation that seems to be most convincing to us ￿ and most conducive for a
further development of the theory ￿ is that the coerciveness of the situation
in￿uences responders’ reactions: the higher the fraction of their potential
earnings they have to give up in order to be able to punish, the harsher will
be their response. This could be explained if we assume that people display
an aversion to the abuse of power by others.
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of important ways.
It introduces the ultimatum reciprocity measure as a powerful tool that pro-
vides new insights into both the nature of reciprocal behaviour and the het-
erogeneity of preferences. We thereby extend the results of previous experi-
ments that estimate interdependent preferences by using decisions in dictator
games (e.g., Andreoni & Miller, 2002, Fisman et al., 2007) and other modi￿ed
ultimatum games21 which have focused predominantly on the robustness of
the prediction based on inequity aversion (Kagel & Wolfe, 2001, Andreoni et
al., 2003, Garrod, 2008). Moreover, the ultimatum reciprocity measure con-
veys valuable insights into how the heterogeneous type distribution changes
as a consequence of di￿erences in the situation, as exempli￿ed by a simple
parameter change within our game.
21For instance, see the experiments on the convex ultimatum game (e.g., see Suleiman,
1996, Charness & Rabin, 2002).
25Our data provide evidence of a player type that has received little atten-
tion in the literature so far. This player type aims to level the punishment of
unkind behaviour according to the degree of unkindness, rather than merely
restricting their punishment in response to increasing punishment costs, as
in the more traditional models of reciprocity. To the best of our knowledge,
only the model proposed by Cox et al. (2008) can accommodate this be-
haviour. However, one might argue that the model can accommodate the
behaviour because of its ￿exibility rather than its accuracy. We discuss one
potential weakness of the model and point to a number of possible ways of
how to improve on prediction accuracy, evaluating them in light of our ￿nd-
ings. Our treatment variation seems to suggest that the coerciveness of the
situation is an important determinant on the harshness of the ‘new’ type’s
responses: the more coercive the situation, the harsher the responses and
the less the players bother to nuance their punishment choices. This sug-
gests that the situation’s coerciveness may be the most promising avenue in
which to extend the model in future work.
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28Appendix A Symbols table
Table A.1: Symbols table
Variable Explanation
(c
r) the responder’s con￿ict-payo￿ response function: choice of y as a
function of c
r = x
 the responder’s choice variable of accepting ( = 1) or not
 an indi￿erence curve
 the set of (the responder’s) indi￿erence curves
 fraction of the proposer-o￿er the responder keeps after rejection
p the proposer’s payo￿
r the responder’s payo￿
c
r the responder’s (con￿ict) payo￿ in case of rejection
^ 
(trmt)
i (x) i’s supremum payo￿ in the responder’s choice set Sx (in treatment
trmt)
brj a j-type’s best-response function
E a pair’s endowment
ur(r;p) the responder’s utility function
WTPi i’s willingness to pay for a marginal increase in j’s payo￿
x the proposer’s o￿er
x() the lower acceptance threshold
x() the upper acceptance threshold
y proposer payo￿ after rejection as determined by the responder
y(x) the responder’s o￿er response function
S(x) the responder’s choice set in the proposer-payo￿￿responder-payo￿
space (as determined by x)
Appendix B Instructions and Questionnaire
Instructions22
Thank you for participating in our experiment! In this experiment, you will
make decisions with which you can earn money. How much you will earn
depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. Please
22The following instructions and the questionnaire are translations of the German origi-
nals that are available from the authors upon request. Treatment variations are indicated
by brackets.
29read these instructions very carefully. We kindly ask you to refrain from
any public announcements and attempts to communicate directly with other
participants during the experiment. If you violate this rule, we have to
exclude you from this experiment. If you have any questions, please contact
one of the persons running the experiment; he or she will come to your place
and clarify your questions.
The decision task
In this experiment, you and another person will interact only once. Except for
us, the experimenters, no participant is able to identify the other participant.
At the beginning of the experiment, one of the two persons will be randomly
selected as person A, the other person as person B. Person A receives an
amount of 12 euros from the experimenter. Out of these 12 euros, she o￿ers
a proposal to person B. The proposal can be any amount between 0 and 12
euros. However, the proposal must be an amount in whole euros. If person B
accepts the proposal, she earns the proposal. Person A earns the rest of the
12 euros (12 - proposal). If B rejects the proposal, she earns half [a quarter]
of the proposal and decides on the amount person A will earn. This can
be any amount from the remaining rest (between 0 and 12   proposal/2)
[(between 0 and 12   proposal/4)].
Example: Person A proposes 5 euros. If person B accepts the proposal,
person A earns 7 euros (12   5). If person B rejects the proposal, person
B earns 2.50 euros (proposal/2) [1.25 euros (proposal/4)]. Then, person B
determines the earnings of person A, choosing an amount between 0 and 9.50
(12   2:50) [0 and 10.75 (12   1:25)] euros.
The setup of the experiment
Before we start with the experiment, you will receive an electronic question-
naire which you have to ￿ll in completely. The questionnaire helps you to
understand the rules of the experiment. After all participants have com-
pleted the questionnaire correctly, you will be randomly selected as person
A or person B. Then, person A has to decide on the proposal she will of-
fer to person B. The proposal must be an amount in whole euros. At the
same time, person B has to decide whether to accept or to reject for all
possible proposals (0 euros, 1 euro,..., 12 euros), and, if rejecting an o￿er,
which amount person A will earn. The possible proposals will be shown to
person B in random order. Please note that you cannot change your decision
once you have con￿rmed it. Thereafter, we will ask person B which proposal
30she considers as fair and which proposal she expects to receive from person
A. When each person B has decided on all possible proposals, we will select
randomly and anonymously for each person A a person B. Payo￿s for person
A and person B are determined by the proposal of person A and person B’s
decision, which she determined for the particular proposal beforehand. This
means, that each decision of person B is relevant for the determination of the
payo￿s. At the end of the experiment, we will inform you of your payo￿ and
ask you to answer a short socio-demographic questionnaire (your age, your
sex, etc.). Then you will receive your payo￿ privately; no other participant
will be able to see what you have earned.
Questionnaire
Please mark the correct answers for the following questions. They will help
you to understand the rules of the experiment. Please note that there could
be more than one correct answer, so that you have to mark in those cases
more than one answer.
(1) Suppose person A o￿ers 6 euros. Person B rejects. How much does
person B earn?
a. 1 [0.50] euros
b. 3 [1.50] euros
c. 6 euros
(2) In the situation described in question (1), from which interval does
person B choose person A’s payo￿?
a. 0 to 12 euros
b. 0 to 6 euros
c. 0 to 9 [10.5] euros





(4) Suppose person B receives a proposal of 0 euros and rejects the pro-
posal. Which statement is correct?
31a. Person B earns 0 euros.
b. Person B earns 0.50 euros.
c. Person B chooses person A’s earnings from the interval 0 to 6
euros.
d. Person B chooses person A’s earnings from the interval 0 to 12
euros.
Appendix C Participants’ socio-economic back-
ground & o￿er and payo￿ data
Table C.1: Socio-demographic summary of participants
Age mean: 23.8 (4.1) range: 18-57
Number of siblings mean: 1.47 (1.23) range: 0-8
Female 50.0%
Work experiencey 26.9%
Majorz 0: 7.5%, 1: 3.3%, 2: 19.3%, 3: 40.3%, 4: 29.5%
Experimental experience 1: 11.5%, 2: 28.5%, 3: 24.9%, 4: 35.1%
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; ythe question was: ￿Do you work for 10
or more hours a week?￿; zcategories: 0: no student, 1: medicine, 2: human science,
3: natural science, 4: mathematics and economics; categories: 1: novice, 2: less
than 3 experiments, 3: less than 6 experiments, 4: more than 5 experiments.
Table C.2: Average payo￿s and o￿ers
high- low-
Proposer payo￿ 5.52 (1.90) 5.43 (2.61)
Responder payo￿ 5.24 (1.59) 4.42 (2.01)
O￿ers 5.57 (1.14) 4.91 (1.43)
Expected o￿ers 5.55 (1.51) 5.37 (1.50)
Stated ‘fair’ o￿ers 6.03 (0.89) 5.94 (0.95)
Note: Treatment averages, standard deviations in parentheses; treatment
di￿erence signi￿cant at  = 0:05, at  = 0:01, at  = 0:001.
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